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ARE WE EQUAL TO IT?
(From "THE SHINGLE," PhiladelphiaBar Association, October, 1938)

T

HE most casual observer cannot but be impressed with a growing
sense of world-wide instability and slipping of standards. The
thoughtful, reflective person recognizes that civilization, as representing
the accumulation of generations of experiences, faces a breakdown, in
great part at least. Forces are rampant which, unless checked, intelligently subdued and then wisely directed, will bring about a collapse and
destruction of a form of government which has given man the greatest
sense of freedom and security in the history of any civilized society.
For the most part, restlessness and dissatisfaction have arisen from
a sense of economic insecurity. Admittedly, there have been many injustices-the inevitable outgrowth of a rapidly changing world. But imperfections have and always will exist in any form of society.
Leaders are an essential factor in any organized body, but proper
limitation of them is a vital necessity if society is to enjoy the freedom
and liberties for which so many generations of mankind have struggled,
fought and died.
The constant attacks on the judiciary by those elected to important
posts cannot help but be viewed with concern and alarm by those who
are or should be the zealous guardians of a constitutional form of government. Measured in terms of years and numbers, the indiscretions or digressions from the path of sworn duty have been immeasurably insignificant amongst those elevated to the bench. Is it not time that bar associations take positive and forceful steps to set forth clearly the self-evident
fact that this increasing cry of persons clothed with executive power, in
denunciation of the judiciary, will end only with the destruction of those
privileges which make a free people! The present crisis has caused a
situation far beyond the division of political beliefs and party struggles.
The question is whether the counsel of disinterested and wise persons will
prevail and so help ride out a storm that portends grave peril to the real
and ultimate welfare of a democratic society. Will the lawyers, as citizens, arise not so much to an opportnity as to a duty and responsibility,
which, by virtue of their training and oath of office, peculiarly rests upon
and with them?
As a thoughtful author has recently said: "What we need today is
a militant humanism, conscious of its own virility and inspired by the
knowledge that the principles of freedom, tolerance and skepticism must
not be exploited by shameless and unscrupulous fanatics."
The Editor.
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STATUS OF SECOND MORTGAGES EXECUTED BY
BORROWERS FROM HOME OWNERS' LOAN
CORPORATION
By SAMUEL H. STERLING, of the Denver Bar

T HAS developed that, when the Home Owners' Loan
Corporation was making loans in accordance with the Act
of Congress approved on June 13, 1933, and subsequently
amended, a number of original mortgagees of the borrowers
who obtained loans, took back second mortgages in addition
to the bonds and cash which they received from the Corporation. The validity or effect of such second mortgages has been
the basis of a considerable number of suits brought for cancellation of the lien, or interposed as a defense when used as the
basis for an action.
Among various powers and authorities granted to the
Home Owners' Loan Corporation was the provision that the
Corporation would be "under the direction of the Board and
operated by it under such by-laws, rules and regulations as it
may prescribe for the accomplishment of the purpose and intent of this section." The Act further specifically provided
that, "The Board is authorized to make such by-laws, rules
and regulations not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Section, that may be necessary for the proper conduct of the
affairs of the Corporation."
In accordance with the terms of the Act, the Board, from
time to time, promulgated many rules and regulations which
concerned the procedure of taking applications for loans, the
various preliminary phases to making loans, and the final consummation of first liens, coupled with payment to the mortgagee or mortgagees then of record, through the medium of
bonds or cash.
Although the Act did not specifically preclude the execution of a second mortgage by the borrowers to the original
mortgagee, the Board, in its Manual of Rules and Regulations,
passed in accordance with the power or authority conferred by
the Act, did provide that: "The Corporation will not refund
any indebtedness where the mortgagor is required to pay more
than he owes, through agreements either to pay future interest
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to the original mortgagee, or to absorb any loss of interest by
the original mortgagee, or to guarantee any difference between
the face value of the bonds plus accrued interest thereon and
the market value of the same, or to cover any assumed loss on
account of acceptance of the bonds of the Corporation by the
mortgagee. The Corporation will not become a party to any
contract between a mortgagor and mortgagee in reference to
indebtedness refunded by the Corporation." In addition to
this general statement, the Manual further provided that:
"Where the full amount of the indebtedness against the property cannot be refunded by the Corporation, the mortgagee or
other lien holder will be permitted to take a second mortgage
or second deed of trust if the amount of such second mortgage
or deed of trust does not exceed the difference between the Corporation's appraisal and the amount of the Corporation's first
mortgage. In no case shall the second trust or second mortgage to such other mortgagee or lien holder be in terms which
would cause the mortgagor's payments to the Corporation to
be a hardship, or deprive the mortgagor of reasonable opportunity to pay such second mortgage or second trust."
The procedure used by the Corporation was, first, to decide that the applicant was elegible and that the value of the
property permitted the making of a loan, and second, to obtain
the consent of the mortgagee to accept the amount of'bonds or
cash which the Corporation, under its rules, could pay. In
order to satisfy this second requirement, a mortgagee was required to sign an instrument known as "Mortgagee's Consent
to Take Bonds." This consent was addressed to the Corporation, and originally read in part as follows:
"The undersigned is a holder of a first mortgage or other obligation,
which constitutes a lien or claim on the title to the home property of
--- --located at
(Number)
(Street)
(City)
-----------------------------------------in the sum of $
(State)
"Being informed that said owner has made application to Home
Owners' Loan Corporation to refund his said indebtedness, the undersigned has considered the method of refunding mortgages provided in
Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933; as passed by Congress and approved
by the President, and the undersigned hereby consents, if said refunding

can be consummated, to accept in full settlement of the claim of the

282

DICTA

----------- face value of the bonds of Home
undersigned the sum of $
Owners' Loan Corporation, to be adjusted with not exceeding $50 cash
as provided in said act, and thereupon to release all the cliam of the undersigned against said property.
"It is understood that you will incur trouble and expense in connection with your effort to refund the indebtedness of said home owner, and
this consent is executed in consideration of the same and shall be binding
for a period of ---------days from date.
193----."
"T his, the ------------- day of ---------------------------,-----

There are several main questions which seem to be involved in determining the legality of a second mortgage which
was taken back by the original mortgagee. The first of these
is whether the Mortgagee's Consent to Take Bonds, wherein
the mortgagee agreed to accept bonds of the Home Owners'
Loan Corporation in full settlement of his claim, operates as a
release in full of the borrower's indebtedness, and the second,
whether the note secured by a second mortgage taken back by
the original mortgagee is void as against public policy.
To determine these questions, the procedure used by the
Corporation in closing its loans must be borne in mind. It
must further be remembered that the Mortgagee's Consent was
executed by him voluntarily, and that prior to the execution
of such Consent, the mortgagee had the choice of resorting to
his legal remedies under the lien which he then held (and which
necessarily had to be delinquent) in settlement of his claim.
He chose, however, to voluntarily sign a Consent and to accept
the bonds in the amount offered to him by the Corporation.
The determination of the question now properly brings
to mind the consideration of whether the consent complies
with the doctrine of accord and satisfaction. An accord is
defined as being "An agreement whereby one of the parties
undertakes to give or perform, and the other to accept in satisfaction of a claim, liquidated or in dispute, and arising either
from contract or from tort, something other than or different
than what he is, or considers himself entitled to; and a 'satisfaction' is the execution of such agreement." (Improved Industrial Order of Wise Men vs. Muskogee Securities National
Bank, 139 Okla. 16, 280 Pac. 1087.)
Ordinarily accord and satisfaction is confined to unliquidated or disputed claims, but it may also apply to liquidated
claims or to liquidated claims not in dispute.
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Assuming that the lien which the Home Owners' Loan
Corporation took over was a liquidated claim, the courts very
generally have approved the principle that if a payment be
made from funds furnished by or derived from another than
the debtor, even though the amount is less than the liquidated
or undisputed claim, it is an accord and satisfaction. ( 1 C. J.,
Accord and Satisfaction, Sec. 5 1; 1 RCL, Accord and Satisfaction, Sec. 28; Peoples Exchange Bank vs. Miller, 139 Kan. 3,
29 Pac. (2) 1079.)
In all cases where the Corporation refunded an indebtedness, there was no dispute between the parties as to the method
of refinancing, and the transaction constituted an absolute
agreement to substitute a different performance for the one
provided by the original paper.
In 1 C. J., Accord and Satisfaction, Sec. 60, there is the
statement that:
"The acceptance of bills of exchange or checks of a third person for
a less amount than that due, in satisfaction thereof, operates as an accord
and satisfaction. So the giving and acceptance of an order on a third
person for less than the amount due, which order is duly paid, operates
(Citing cases.)
as an accord and satisfaction."

Further in 1 RCL, Accord and Satisfaction, Sec. 27, it is
stated that:
"If a debtor gives his creditor a note, check or other security of a
third person for a sum less than the debt and this is received in full satisfaction of the debt, this will constitute a good accord and satisfaction.
This is a clear case of the creditor receiving something to which he was
not entitled by his contract, and which he could not demand." (Citing
cases. )

The adequacy of the consideration, if questioned, is immaterial. 13 C. J. Contracts, Sec. 637, enunciates the principle that:
i "The inadequacy, as has been well said, is for the parties to consider at the time of making this agreement.-

Where the amount received by the original mortgagee was
not liquidated or matured, then, of course, the general proposition is that:
"Where a claim is unliquidated or in dispute, payment and accept-

ance of a less sum than claimed, in satisfaction, operates as an accord and
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satisfaction, in the absence of fraud, artifice, mistake or imposition.
* * *"
(1 C. J., Accord and Satisfaction, Sec. 71.)

It would thus seem to be established that payment by the
Corporation to an original mortgagee in bonds of a total value
less than the sum due the creditor, regardless of whether the
claim was liquidated or unliquidated, matured or unmatured,
such payment by the Corporation and receipt by the original
mortgagee would be sufficient basis for the courts to apply the
doctrine of Accord and Satisfaction.
The second question is whether or not a second mortgage
executed by the borrower to the original mortgagee for a deficiency when refinancing the loan, is void as against public policy. It must be borne in mind that the courts have uniformly
held the Home Owners' Loan Corporation to be a relief agency
and as such, it is to be considered in somewhat of a class by
itself. In Pye vs. Gunart, 275 N. W. 615, the court stated
that:
"The policy announced by the Home Owners' Loan Act is a policy of the United States by which we are bound, and there can be no
question but that the United States can make its prohibition binding
upon others than the technical parties to the loan contract in order to
protect the borrowers. The Home Owners' Loan Corporation was created as a relief agency to save the investment of small home owners in
distress by judiciously refinancing their obligations on such homes, and
in connection with the significant purpose of the Act it justifiably prohibited contracts of the nature herein involved."

The principle that a contract is unenforceable which
tends in a marked degree to bring about results sought to be
prevented by an Act of Conaress is found in Sage vs. Hampe,
235 W. S.99, 59 L. Ed. 147:
"A contract that invokes prohibited conduct makes the contractor
a contributor to such conduct. (Citing cases.)
And more broadly, it
long has been recognized that contracts that obviously and directly tend
in a marked degree to bring about results that the law seeks to prevent
cannot be made the ground of a successful suit. (Citing cases.)
It appears to us that this is a contract of that class. It called for an act that
could not be done at the time, and it tended to lead the defendant to
induce the Indian owner to attempt what the law, for his own good,
forbade."

In the case of Chaves County Building and Loan Assn.
vs. Hodges, 59 Pac. (2nd) 671 (New Mex.), a case which
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involved a violation of a Mortgagee's Consent to Take Bonds,
the court states that:
"It has been held that the courts should take judicial notice of the
fact that the Home Owners' Loan Corporation is strictly a relief agency,
organized to aid distressed home owners in saving their homes. The
reduction in the amount of the home owner's debt (which, of course, can
be accomplished only with the consent of his creditor) is the most effective aid, in most instances, which can be rendered to him. Merely to put
off the evil day of foreclosure would fail to carry out the purposes of the
act. If the debt is more than 80% of the value of the home, creditor
refused to discount his claim, the law afford no remedy. However, the
creditor generally chooses to exchange his lien for a smaller sum in bonds.
The Home Owners' Loan Corporation is interested in the reduction of
the indebtedness of the home owner who procures a loan."
"The exact amount of the indebtedness to be canceled by the acceptance of its bonds and the amount loaned by the creditor on the tendered security are subjects upon which the Home Owners' Loan Corporation is entitled to accurate information; and which we may assume is to
be considered in determining the amount which can be safely loaned to
the home owners."

The case of Cook vs. Donner, 66 Pac. 2nd Series, p. 587
(Kans.), which concerned a second mortgage on property refinanced by the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, decided that:
"The Note and Mortgage sued on in this action were out of harmony with the statute and rules authorizing the work of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation and the release issued thereunder and showed bad
faith, and were against public policy and therefore null and void."

In the Cook case, the court further considered the fact
that certain state officials of the Corporation, and its attorneys,
knew that a second mortgage was going to be executed by the
borrower for the benefit of the original mortgagee, and claimed

that such knowledge would comply with the Corporation's

requirements governing the approval of second mortgages.
Concerning this point, the court stated:
"That the claimed ratification was not effective because of the absolute invalidity of the Note and Mortgage."

In the case of Jessevich vs. Abbene, 277 N. Y. S. 599, the
ruling of the court was against "secret collateral agreements as
violative of the Home Owners' Loan Act." Further stating:
"Collusive agreement between creditor and home owner creating
on the owner-occulied home encumbrances too heavy and terms too se-
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vere for the home owner to work out his problem would easily defeat
the very purpose of this act, interfere by trickery with this Corporation
collecting its bonds, and the government's financial assistance would
merely delay the inevitable foreclosure suit which it meant to prevent.
The second mortgagee would thereby benefit by his own wrong, first, in
being paid by the government the greater part of his second mortgage in
its tax exempt bonds which it guarantees unconditionally both as to
principal and interest; then by getting the defendant's homestead through
foreclosure for the small balance due; and, lastly, by getting the benefit
of the excellent first mortgage thereon, never intended for him."
"This contract calls for an act by the defendant owners which the
law for their own good forbade. The United States can make its prohibitions binding to the extent necessary effectively to carry out its policies.
Sage vs. Hampe, 235 U. S. 99, 35 S. Ct. 94, 59 L. Ed. 147. It is against
the policy of the law to enable either party in controversies between
themselves to enforce an agreement in fraud of the law. Edward Hart
vs. City Theatres Co., 215 N. Y. 322, 109 N. E. 497."

An attempt was made in the Cook v. Donner case to distinguish between a "secret collusive agreement" and one where
the state officials of the Corporation knew that a second mortgage was to be executed. In disposing of this point, the court
stated that "Such agreement would seem to be prohibited
whether they be secret or not."
In the First Citizens Bank and Trust Company of Utica
vs. Speaker, 294 N. Y. S. 831, the plaintiff took a secured note
for the balance allegedly due after refinancing with the Corporation. The court stated:
"We are of the opinion that the taking of the note on which this
suit is based is against public policy and that the note itself is void."

Other cases are: Lyon vs. Adams, 294 N. Y. S. 732;
Westchester Trust Company vs. Beicher, 247 App. Div. Rep.
778 (N. Y.); Meek vs. Wilson, 278 N. W. 731 (Mich.).
Stager vs. Junker, et al., 188 Atl. 440, contains the statement that:
"The Home Owners' Loan Act, 48 Stat. 128 (see USCA 1461
et seq.), was intended to provide emergency relief with respect to home
mortgage indebtedness, and the rules of the corporation provide that no
loan will be made where there was a separate understanding or agreement
between the debtor and the holder of the mortgage calling for any payments other than those required by the corporation. The plaintiff, in
order to facilitate the loan, stated the full extent of his debt and agreed
to accept a definite number of bonds at face value in full settlement
thereof. He was then precluded from exacting any further or other
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agreement from his debtor looking to the payment of the additionalsum.
The mere fact that he exacted the instrument in suit, while the negotiations were pending and after he had agreed to accept a definite number of
bonds in full settlement, denotes bad faith toward the lending agency.
When he agreed to an acceptance of such reduction of bond interest, the
acceptance related back to the first agreement, and was a reiteration of the
promise there made to accept the bonds agreed upon in full settlement of
the defendant's obligation in accordance with the rules of the lending
corporation deemed necessary to rehabilitate the home owner. By means
of the secret agreement the plaintiff could not defeat the express terms of
his own agreement to accept the bonds of the lending agency in full settlement of the defendants' obligation."

In another recent decision, Anderson vs. Horst, 200 Ati.
721, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, dealing with a second mortgage, stated:
"We are of opinion, therefore, that an agreement between the mortgagee and the home owner, made without the approval of the Corporation, by which the home owner assumes or agrees to pay all :or any part
of the mortgage debt which had been settled and released by the refunding effected by the Corporation is void as against public policy and will
not be allowed to be enforced by the mortgagee."

Finally, assuming that the defense of ratification or subsequent approval is interposed, 13 C. J. 506 (Sec. 452-53)
states that:
"A contract malum in se against public policy cannot be made valid
by ratification. * * * An agreement void as against public policy cannot be rendered valid by invoking the doctrine of estoppel."
. "It is obvious that a contract illegal or against public policy
cannot
be rendered valid by a subsequent ratification."
tracts," Sec. 679.

2 Elliott on "Con-

Although other legal issues may be involved in any particular case, the foregoing is intended merely as a general discussion of the salient points in controversies between original
borrowers and mortgagees as to the validity of second mortgages or deed of trust executed in connection with loans refinanced by the Home Owners' Loan Corporation.

COLORADO BAR REORGANIZED
By WILBUR F. DENIOUS

T HE reorganization plan, which was freely discussed during
the past year, was unanimously adopted by the Colorado
Bar Association at its meeting last September, and is now in
operation.
Under the new plan the local bar associations which elect
to become affiliated with the Colorado Association are in fact
the foundation of bar organization in this state. The members of each such local association automatically become members of the State Association, with the dues reduced from
$6.00 to $3.00. All of the local associations except one have
elected to affiliate. The membership of the State Association
thus enlarged includes 75 per cent of the Colorado bar. The
organization for the first time is truly representative and authorized to speak for the bar of this state.
In addition to the affiliation feature, the principal objectives of the new plan are (1) to make the state organization
actually representative of the local associations, and (2) to
give continuity to the work and efforts of the organization.
To accomplish the representative feature, each local association selects its own representative on the Board of Governors, in which is lodged the executive control of the organization, and if any local association has more than one hundred
members it may select one such representative for each one hundred members or fraction thereof. From this board the president selects an executive committee of five members, which
may act when the board is not in session.
Each local association also selects its representative on
each of the standing committees. To prevent the committees
from being unwieldy, the president may select five of the members as the active members and the remainder are associate
members. Provision is made for four vice-presidents, and one
must come from each Congressional District.
There are five on the nominating committee. The presi288
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dent is an ex-officio member, and of the other four, one must
come from each Congressional District.
To accomplish the feature of continuity, the terms of the
members of the Board of Governors and of the standing committees are staggered so that half of the members are selected
each year and the other half hold over. A president-elect is
chosen each year. He immediately becomes an ex-officio member of the Board of Governors, and becomes president one year
hence, thus giving him a whole year to become familiar with
the work of the association and to formulate his own plans.
It is believed the new plan will work well. It may need
revision from time to time, but this can easily be brought
about.
Under the leadership of G. Dexter Blount, as president,
the new administration is starting off vigorously and enthusiastically. The president and secretary have already made official visits to several local associations. They are handicapped
by not having a journal, which would enable them to communicate frequently with the members and the local associations, but that will soon be remedied, and once the organization is under way it will render valuable services to the members and the public.
This will undoubtedly be one of the most active and successful years in the history of the Colorado Bar Association.
The officers and some of the committees of the association are as follows:
President, G. DEXTER BLOUNT

6 10 Equitable Bldg., Denver

--

President-Elect, WILLIAM R. KELLY

-----------------

---- Greeley

Grand Junction
Senior Vice-President, GuY V. STERNBERG ----------------Vice-Presidents, H. LAWRENCE HINKLEY

-----------------

DAVID P. STRICKLER. ------------

STANLEY T. WALLBANK
Secretary, FRED Y. HOLLAND ----------------------

Treasurer, EDWARD C. KING

------

Sterling

Colorado Springs

Equitable
-----

Bldg., Denver

214 Capitol Bldg., Denver

P. 0. Box 480, Denver
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BOARD OF GOVERNORS
E. B. ADAMS
--------------------- Grand Junction
CLAY R. APPLE
-------------------------- Greeley
GEORGE M. CORLETT
--------------- Monte Vista
JOHN J. DOWNEY
------------------------Cortez
WILLIAM W. GAUNT
-------------------- Brighton
H.

LAWRENCE HINKLEY
----------------- Sterling
HERSCHEL HORN
Lamar
WILLIAM R. KELLY
---------------------- Greeley
HARRY S. PETERSEN -------------------------------------Pueblo
LEON H. SNYDER ------------------------Colorado Springs
F. W. STOVER
----------------------- Fort Collins
L. P. WELD
-------------------------Longmont
GEORGE H. WILKES
--------------------Florence

DENVER:
FRAZIER ARNOLD

E. B.

ROBERT G. BOSWORTH

JAMES A. MARSH

WILBUR F.

FOWLER

DENIOUS
DUDLEY STRICKLAND
JAMES A. WOOD

STANDING COMMITTEES
(Except the Executive, Grievance and Special Committees,
not yet selected)
COMMITTEE ON MEMBERSHIP

JOHN W. O'HAGAN, Chairman --------------------

Greeley

FRANK D. ALLEN ------------------------------------- Akron
WILLIAM R. ARTHUR
-------------------- Boulder
H. SHIELDS MASON
--------------- Denver

JAMES F. QUINE

---------------- Colorado Springs

(EDITOR'S NOTE-Dicta to continue substantially in its present

form, with a section thereof devoted to current events, personal items,
communications between and among the state and local associations, notices, etc., of the Colorado Bar Association, to cover approximately four
to eight pages; the general supervision and management of DICTA to
remain in the Board of Editors of DICTA, who would welcome and be
glad to publish suitable articles by any member of the Colorado Bar; the
material for the section devoted to the Colorado Bar Association affairs
to be furnished and edited by the officers or representatives of the Colorado Bar Association. This arrangement to continue for a stated or
indefinite period, subject to termination by either, or to be continued in
some modified form mutually satisfactory to both organizations. Some
experience must be had before a definite and binding plan could be
worked out.)

AN EARLY EXPRESSION ON "NEW" RULES OF
PROCEDURE
By WM. B. KING, of the Denver Bar

N

OW that the United States Supreme Court has adopted
the new Rules to "govern the procedure in the District
Courts of the United States in all suits of a civil nature whether
cognizable as cases at law or in equity," providing that "there
shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil action,' " and
requiring that a pleading shall contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,"
and in view of the favorable comment upon such rules by the
profession generally, it is interesting to exhume the comments
made in connection with certain provisions of the Code of
Iowa, in the case of McFaul vs. Ramsey, 20 How. 523:
"The common law * * * necessarily requires that the
controversy * * * be reduced to one or more integral propositions. * * * The pleadings, in every form of common law
action, have been * * * completely reduced to simple, clear
and unambiguous forms. * * * This system, matured by the
wisdom of ages, founded on principles of truth and sound reason, has been ruthlessly abolished in many of our states, who
have rashly substituted in its place the suggestions of sciolists
who invent new codes and systems of pleading to order. But
this attempt to abolish all species, and establish a single genus,
is found to be beyond the power of legislative omnipotence.
They cannot compel the human mind not to distinguish between things that differ. The distinction between the different forms of actions for different wrongs, requiring different
remedies, lies in the nature of things; it is absolutely inseparable from the correct administration of justice in common law
courts.
"The result of these experiments, so far as they have
come to our knowledge, has been to destroy the certainty and
simplicity of all pleadings, and introduce on the record an
endless wrangle in writing, perplexing to the court, delaying
and impeding the administration of justice. In the case of
Randon vs. Toby, 11 How. 517, we had occasion to notice
the operation and result of a code similar to that of Iowa. * * *
In the case of Bennett vs. Butterworth, 11 How. 669, originating under the same code, the court were unable to discover from
the pleadings the nature of action or the remedy sought. It
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might, with equal probability, be called an action of debt, or
detinue, or replevin, or trover, or trespass, or a bill in chancery.
* * * In both these cases this court have endeavored to impress
the minds of the Judges of the District and Circuit Courts of
the United States with the impropriety of permitting those
experimental codes of pleading and practice to be inflicted upon
them.
"They cannot adopt these novel inventions, which propose to amalgamate law and equity by enacting a hybrid system of pleadings unsuited to the administration of either."

THE DENVER LEGAL AID SOCIETY
By JACOB V. SCHAETZEL, Treasurer

T HE
Denver Legal Aid Society, at a meeting held on September 27, 1938, decided to change the method of operating the cases coming under its jurisdiction.
Heretofore all legal work has been done by Harry C.
Green, the General Counsel in charge, and his assistant. From
now on Mr. Green will act as General Counsel for the purpose
of interviewing clients and ascertaining whether or not they
have cases requiring relief, and doing the necessary emergency
work which might be required of him. His chief function,
however, will be to refer worthy clients to practicing attorneys
who have indicated their willingness to cooperate with the
work of the Society.
The members of the executive committee have been endeavoring for some time to find a way to give the younger attorneys an opportunity of getting more practice, and at the
same time becoming associated with the work of the bar in
general. Under the proposed plan it is hoped that enough of
the older lawyers will indicate a willingness to consult with
and assist the younger members of the bar who have taken
these cases for the poor of Denver.
A letter is now being sent by the Society requesting lawyers to assist in this work, but whether a letter is received or
not, the bar in general is invited to participate in this work,
and a letter addressed to any of the officers or members of the
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executive committee will be greatly appreciated. The officers
in charge of the new setup are as follows:
JOHN E. GORSUCH, President
HORACE N. HAWKINS, Executive Committee
JACOB V. SCHAETZEL, Treasurer
HARRY C. GREEN, General Counsel

Any additional information can be received by telephoning Harry C. Green, or talking to any of the officers. It is
hoped that the new plan will be received with enthusiasm, and
will give an outlet for a great many cases which heretofore have
been handled by the Society direct.
The work of the Legal Aid Society would be considered
in the nature of "big business" by any law office in the city.
For the first seven months in 1938 there were 1,224
people who applied for assistance. This assistance took various forms. A tabulation of these cases is as follows:
Matters concerning personal property --------- 87
Real property
------------126
Torts
--------------------------------88
Contracts
-----------------------------96
Domestic Relations
--------------------334
Compensation cases for workmen ............
18
Collections where amounts were so small that
no attorney could handle the job --------- 440
Criminal matters
-----------------------22
Bankruptcy where no fees were involved ------ 60
Ordinary inquiries
----------------------86
1,224
The present plan contemplates that the attorney to
whom the case is referred will charge a reasonable fee, based on
the ability of the client to pay, or no fee at all if the client is
unable to pay.
All judges of all the courts have indicated an interest in
the new plan, and will no doubt assist the work of the lawyers
who have these cases pending before their various divisions.
In the past there has been some criticism that the work
done in the Legal Aid was interfering with the practice of
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many of the lawyers, particularly the younger members of the
bar, as many of them were perfectly willing to handle the cases
even for the nominal fees involved. This will afford a splendid opportunity to work on the scheme and all of the officers
and members of the executive committee are very anxious to
give this new plan a good tryout.
Later in the autumn it is expected that an evening will
be devoted to a discussion of the operation of the Legal Aid
Bureau by the attorneys who have indicated a willingness to
cooperate and assist in this work.
The Denver Bar Association will be asked to devote one
day to a discussion of the problems of the younger attorneys,
and an explanation of the new method of the operation of the
Legal Aid Bureau will then be given. Comments on this new
plan will be greatly appreciated by the officers.
Sincerely yours,
JACOB V. SCHAETZEL, Treasurer.
A COMPLIMENT TO MR. G. DEXTER BLOUNT
Mr. Blount has been complimented by having his "Digest of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" reprinted in the Massachusetts Bar Quarterly, the Nebraska Law Bulletin and the Oklahoma State Bar Journal.

WASHINGTON. D. C.
A MEETING OF THE BAR OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED

STATES IN

DAY. NOVEMBER 26TH.

THE COURTROOM.
1938, AT 11

ON SATUR-

O'CLOCK A. M., IS

CALLED TO TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION IN

MEMORY OF

THE LATE MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO.
ROBERT H. JACKSON.
SOLICITOR GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES.

A Question of Reputation
By WM. HEDGES

ROBINSON,

Denver

"The court limited character witnesses to twenty-five to a side.
After defendant's attorney had examined twenty-five to prove good
character of defendant, the attorney tendered to court a list of 400, offering to give their names. The District Attorney examined twenty-five
witnesses and made tender of 600 more, whereupon attorneys for defendant made tender of 1,000 additional witnesses. The court held that
the question of reputation began with a challenge and finally degenerated
into a competition in offers of attorneys." People vs. Arnold, 93 N. E.
786.

Cheer Up, Boys, It May Be Just Around the Corner!
By CARLE WHITEHEAD, Denver

"In suit for infringement of copyright of song by sales of phonograph records, where there was little dispute as to sales, only one item of
cost was contested, and $1,057.53 was recovered as profits, $1,000.00
counsel fee was proper." Davilla vs. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co.,
94F. (2nd) 567.

DURANGO TO THE FRONT' AGAIN
Mr. Chas. J. Beise, of the Durango Bar, submits the following excerpt from an old case. Names are omitted for the reason that descendants of the parties involved still reside in the community.

By Mr. Knaebel:
I desire to call Colonel
By the Court:
Mr. Knaebel, this is a case tried to the court, and it is for
the court to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of the witnesses. You are a stranger in the community, and are not acquainted with the witnesses. From the
295
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standing of this person offered as a witness, in this community, and from the court's personal knowledge of him,
I cannot believe him under oath; in truth, it is the opinion
of this court that this man, under all circumstances and
conditions, would swear to a lie rather than the truth.
Yet it is your privilege to put him on the witness stand,
but it will be necessary for you to have very strong corroborative evidence to induce a belief in the mind of the court
of the truth of what this witness swears to.
By Mr. Knaebel:
Your Honor takes me somewhat by surprise; I had no intimation of such a thing; I desire to prove by Colonel
that he was Indian Agent; I desire in regardBy the Court:
The facts that he swears to must be corroborated before
the court will believe him.
By Mr. Knaebel:
Colonel

, will you take the stand?

By the Witness:
I am not subpoenaed, I don't care to take the stand; I have
the same opinion of the court that the court has of me,
only a little bit more so.
(The record is silent as to what, if anything, the court did upon
hearing the witness' opinion above expressed.)

You Wouldn't Believe Me ***
By ELMER BROCK, JR., Den'er

"Mr. Terrell C. Drinkwater, a member of our bar, is the local attorney for the Keeley Cure Institute."

CEMETERIES-REAL ESTATE-RULES, REGULATIONS AND RESTRIC-

TIONS-Gasser, et al. vs. Crown Hill Cemetery Association-No.
14174-Decided October 24, 1938-District Court of Jefferson
County-Hon. Samuel W. Johnson, Judge-Affirmed. EN
BANC.

FACTS: Plaintiff, a corporation owning and operating a cemetery,
sold a plot to one B. At the time of the sale there were in effect certain
rules and regulations concerning the type of monuments or markers permitted and providing that they must be approved by the superintendent.
A manufacturer of a marker not approved by the superintendent, with
alleged permission of the superintendent, but without the required writ-,ten approval of the association, proceeded to dig a hole and place a
cement foundation upon the grave space owned by B. The plaintiff
brought suit for injunctive relief, which was granted.
HELD: 1. The rights of the owner of a cemetery lot in a cemetery
owned and operated by a private corporation are subject to the established rules and by-laws of the corporation, in so far as they are not in
violation of any law, and are not discriminatory and arbitrary.
2. Every owner of real estate, in fee simple, has the legal right to
dispose of it either absolutely or conditionally, or to regulate the manner
in which it shall be used, provided that conditions and restrictions imposed are not violative of the public good or subversive of public interests.
3. Where it appears that regulation is reasonable and for the best
interests of the party in favor of whom it is imposed and does not materially prejudice the interests of the public, the law upholds it.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke.

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW -

TAXATION -

CHARITABLE

PURPOSE -

Spears' Free Clinic and Hospital vs. Wilson, etc.-No. 14329Decided October 24, 1938-District Court of Denver-Hon.
Henry A. Hicks, Judge-Affirmed. EN BANC.
HELD: 1. Where a free clinic and hospital for children, a nonprofit corporation, organized for strictly charitable purposes, owns two
apartment houses in Denver and the two lots upon which they stand,
as well as an adjacent lot, which is vacant and is alleged to be held for the
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purpose of constructing a hospital thereon as soon as the corporation's
financial condition will permit, and where the property is not used by
the corporation itself, but is rented to tenants in the usual way, although
the income from the rentals is devoted to carrying out the corporate purposes, it would be a violation of the Colorado Constitution (Section 5,
Article X) to exempt it from taxation.
2. "Inasmuch as the corporation does not occupy the property, it
was not entitled to the exemption" provided by the Constitution, "even
under the liberal interpretation of that provision heretofore given by this
court."
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM-CONSTRUC-

TION-Brownlot, et a[. vs. Wunsch, et al.-No. 14439-Decided
October 13, 1938-District Court of Denver-Hon. Robert W.
Steele, Judge-Affirmed. EN BANC.
FACTS: Plaintiffs in error seek a review of the decision of the Secretary of State, upheld by the District Court, arising under their protest,
and holding sufficient a petition for the initiation of a proposed constitutional amendment.
HELD: 1. Article V, Section 1 of the Constitution relates to the
initiative and referendum and by it the people reserve to themselves the
power to propose laws and amendments to the Constitution and to enact
or reject the same at the polls independently of the General Assembly.
Although by express words it is declared that this section in all respects
shall be self-executing, it is clearly contemplated by its terms that legislation may be enacted to further its operation.
2.
It has generally been held by the courts of all jurisdictions that
a constitutional provision for the initiative and referendum and statutes
enacted in connection therewith should be liberally construed.
3.
The constitutional right reserved to the people may be facilitated and not hampered by either technical statutory provisions or technical construction thereof, further than is necessary to fairly guard
against fraud and mistake in the exercise by the people of this constitutional right.
4. Neither the Secretary of State nor any reviewing court should
be concerned with the merit or lack of merit of a proposed constitutional
amendment.
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5. Where a petition has been filed within the six-months period
required by law and is subsequently amended and the amended petition
is filed within the 15-day period provided by law for amendments, the
amended petition has the legal effect of the original petition, although
it was filed after the expiration of said six-months period.
6. The statute contemplates that a sponsor of a petition has the
specified six months within which to secure signatures and file the petition and in the event of protest and rejection of the petition, at their
election, they are entitled, as a matter of course, to refile the petition
within 15 days, even though the refiling date may fall beyond the sixmonths period.
7. It was intended by the Constitution and the legislature that
the identity of the affiant, who swears that each of the persons signing
the petition was, at the time of signing, a qualified elector, and was himself a qualified elector, might be established prima facie by a recital to that
effect in the affidavit.
8. It is certain under the express words of the Constitution that
a petition so verified shall be prima facie evidence that the signatures
thereon are genuine and the persons signing the same are electors.
9. The burden of establishing the grounds for protest rests with
the protestants and the benefit of the prima facie presentation upon the
filing of the original petition is carried over to the filing of the amended
petition.
10. Our statutes relating to administrative and judicial procedure
are replete with the provisions in which the prima facie probity of an
instrument is established by verification or affidavit without the requirement that the identity of the affiant be independently established.
11. Supreme Court measures the pages upon which the petition
was printed and finds that the requirements as to the size of the pages
and the margin at the top of the page have been substantially complied
with.
12. It is not necessary that the affiant certifying the signatures on
the petition have a personal acquaintance with the signer of the petition.
13. The statute makes no provision for an amendment of the
protest and a protest which fails to state the name, section number or line
number by means of which either the Secretary of State or the sponsors
could ascertain the names protested is not sufficient.
14. Protestants may not make the actions of an affiant a basis for
fraud where the petitions notarized by her were rejected in toto by the
secretary.
15. It is not necessary to have attached to each set of signatures an
affidavit; it is sufficient that the affidavit is attached to each petition.
16. A notary public who administers the oath to the signers of
the petition is not shown to be disqualified on the grounds of personal
interest merely because he gave up 15 days' time without compensation
in an effort to obtain additional names and affidavits.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous.
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-WITHDRAWAL

FROM PROVISIONS OF

AcT-Sechler vs. Pastore, et al.-No. 14342-Decided October
17, 1938-District Court of Denver-Hon. Henry A. Hicks,
Judge-Affirmed in part and reversed in part. EN BANC.
FACTS: E, the claimant, sustained compensable injury while engaged as an electrician in the employ of the S Company, making installments of electric outlets in a house being constructed by P, who had
previously let contract for same to S Company. Neither employer nor
contractor carried Workmen's Compensation insurance. The Industrial
Commission ordered both the contractor and the employer to pay compensation to the claimant. P, contractor, instituted present action in
District Court and it entered a decree affirming the award of the commission in all respects and with the further adjudication that the liability for
the payment of compensation as between the employer and the contractor
was therein fixed as a primary liability against the former and a secondaiy liability as against the latter.
1. Employer, once coming under the provisions of the
HELD:
Workmen's Compensation Act, must comply strictly with the provisions
of the statute as to withdrawal from the obligations thereof. He must
give proper notice to the commission and keep his premises posted, even
though at the time of his attempted withdrawal, there were no employees
interested in his status.
2. Where it appears that after his purported rejection of the Act,
the employer from time to time employed workmen, consistency, as well
as the express terms of the statute, require him to keep his premises posted
with notices proclaiming his alleged status with reference to the Act.
3. "It is likely that where a business, subject to the Workmen's
Compensation Act, is conducted by an individual under a firm name, the
statute requiring notice of withdrawal from, or rejection of, the provisions of the Act cannot be circumvented as to such individual by an
internal change of ownership where he continues as a partner and the
business proceeds under the previous name and style."
4. There is no express statutory legislative or judicial authority
giving the commission, or any court reviewing the proceedings of the
commission, the power to determine or fix a comparative degree of liability for the compensation as between the subcontractor employer and
the contractor.
5. The question of who is liable for the compensation payments
is determined under the Act: and questions between those held to be
liable as to the degree of liability must be worked out among themselves
in such proceedings as may be brought for the purpose.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous.
NEW BOOKS IN LIBRARY
Miss Sechrist, of the District Court Law Library, 'reports receipt
in the library of Federal Procedure by Simpkins; Titles by Patton.

